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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, and 
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief is filed in order to dispel any false 
impressions that may have been left by the Brief of Defendant-
Respondent in this appeal. The defendant-respondent Plitt Inter-
mountain Theatres, Incorporated (hereinafter "Plitt") has argued 
in its brief from a succession of extremely broad generalizations 
that have no meaning in the context of this appeal unless they are 
carefully and precisely qualified. The plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland Theatres, Incorporated (hereinafter "Woodland") hereby 
replies to Plitt1s brief in order to insure that this Court has a 
clear and unambiguous statement of the issues in this appeal before 
it. 
Case No. 14440 
Case No. 14441 
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Woodland agrees with Plitt that, "The basic issue pre-
sented for determination by this court is whether by acceptance 
of rental payments under the lease, with knowledge of the alleged 
breaches, the lessor [Woodland] waived those breaches," (Brief 
of Defendant-Respondent at 12.) However, Plitt's conclusions 
on the issue of waiver, as outlined in its brief, are contrary 
to the authorities it cites and are clearly erroneous in the 
context of this appeal. 
I. Acceptance of Rental Payments does not Waive 
Forfeiture of the Leasehold as a Matter of Law. Plitt is clearly 
wrong in arguing that the acceptance of rental payments with 
knowledge of breaches of a lease agreement constitutes waiver 
of the breaches as a matter of law. Waiver, as it applies to 
forfeiture of a leasehold, is a matter of the lessor's intent, 
as manifested verbally, in writing, or by conduct. Certainly, 
the acceptance of rent by a landlord may be an indicator that the 
landlord regards the lease as subsisting and thus waives the 
available forfeiture remedy. Yet, interpreting a landlord's 
acceptance of rent as a demonstration in some instances of his 
intent to waive forfeiture under the lease agreement is far from 
recognizing as a graven principle that the acceptance of rent 
waives a forfeiture of the leasehold as a matter of law. This 
Court has observed the distinction if Plitt's counsel has not. 
' -2-
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In Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 
P.2d 713 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed the 
implications of plaintiffs' actions in determining the waiver 
issue. An intent to waive was deduced from the plaintiffs' con-
duct, but in no way did the plaintiffs' acceptance of rent resolve 
the issue as a matter of law. 
The conduct of plaintiffs over the period of 
years in which Dan's remained in possession, 
particularly after they received written 
notification that the option to renew was 
being exercised and they accepted the in-
creased rental payment, constituted a waiver 
of their right to demand a forfeiture for 
breach of the condition against assignment 
without written consent. Jensen v. O.K. 
Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P.2d 
713, 717 (1973) (emphasis added). 
Utah is not alone in determining the issue of waiver from the 
parties' intent as indicated by the parties' words or conduct, as 
an examination of authorities from other jurisdictions clearly 
demonstrates. See Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 
1959); Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F.2d 35, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Edwards 
Fine Furniture, Inc. v. Ditullio, 252 N.E. 2d 348, 349 (Mass. 1969); 
Weiss v. Johnson, 190 N.E. 2d 834, 836 (111. 1963); Venters v. 
Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Ky. 1962); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 
107 So.2d 765, 768 (Fla. 1959); Fredeking v. Grimmett, 96 S.E.2d 
554, 563 (W. Va. 1955); Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177, 182 
(Wyo. 1951); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343, 344 (Conn. 1950); Miller 
v. Reidy, 260 P. 358, 360 (Cal. 1927); Jones v. Delia Maria, 191 
P. 943 (Cal. 1920); Sanders v. Sutlive Bros. & Co., 174 N.W. 267, 
268 (Iowa 1919); Katz v. Miller, 133 N.W. 1091, 1093 (Wis. 1912). 
Woodland has already outlined in its initial brief 
the factual circumstances tending to establish that any rental 
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payments accepted from Plitt were accepted pursuant to a 
tentative settlement agreement without prejudice to Woodland's 
rights to renew its lawsuits in case the settlement broke down, 
as in fact it did. (Brief of Appellant at 9-10f 15.) As the 
court stated in Jones v. Delia Maria, 191 P. 943 (Cal. 1920), 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right, or such conduct as warrants an 
inference of the relinquishment of such right— 
an election by one to forego some advantage he 
could have taken or insisted upon. A person 
who is in a position to assert a right or 
insist upon an advantage may, by his words or 
conduct, and without reference to any act or 
conduct of the other party affected thereby, 
waive such right. 
However, a personfs words or conduct when laid before the court 
at trial may also demonstrate an intent contrary to the waiver 
of forfeiture. In relation to this appeal/ Woodland has had no 
opportunity to establish the inconsistency of its actions with 
the waiver of Plitt1s forfeiture of the leasehold. Woodland 
deserves a chance to prove that its objective actions belied 
any intent to waive Plitt's forfeiture of the Woodland Drive-
In Theatre leasehold, and accordingly, the district court's 
summary judgment order should be overturned. 
II. The Rule of Waiver does not apply to Claims for Damages. 
Acceptance of rental payments has no bearing whatsoever on a 
lessor's right to maintain a suit for damages on the basis of 
-4-
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the lessee's breaches of the lease agreement. The authorities 
cited by Plitt in support of its concept of waiver do not apply 
waiver in relation to a lessor's suit for damages claiming 
breach by the lessee. See, e.g., Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 233, 507 P.2d 713 (1973); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1959); Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d 293 
(1972); Major v. Hall, 251 So. 2d 444 (La. 1971); Roseman v. 
Day, 184 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1962); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 
2d 765 (Fla. 1959); Snyder v. Hall, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951); 
Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951); Bedford Investment 
Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361, 363 (Cal. 1947); Jones v. Delia Maria, 
191 P. 943 (Cal. 1920); Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co., 79 
S.E. 854 (Ga. 1913). In fact, in one of the cases cited by 
Plitt in its brief to this Court, Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d 
293 (1972), the court specifically points out the right of the 
lessor to bring a suit at law for damages resulting from the 
lessee's alleged breaches of the lease agreement. 
Judgment may be entered for the respondent without 
prejudice to a suit at law for damages for the al-
leged failure to pay the tax increase and without 
prejudice to a new proceeding for the alleged viola-
tion of the use provision of the lease. Id. at 296. 
This last aspect of the court's ruling follows its determination 
that the lessor had waived the lessee's forfeiture of the lease-
hold for precisely the same alleged breaches by accepting rental 
payments. 
-5-
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Plitt relies heavily on the case of Bedford Invest-
ment Co, v, Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1947), to establish that 
a landlord waives all breaches of the lease agreement by the 
lessee and all damages occasioned thereby by accepting payments 
of rent. In Bedfordy the court ruled that respondent lessor 
was not entitled to damages in the amount of the rental value 
($8.33 per day) from May 31r 1946 to date and could not bring 
suit to collect such damages. However, the court's ruling was 
based on uncontroverted evidence in the record before it estab-
lishing that the appellants lessees had paid their rent to the 
lessor pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement "right up to 
date." Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361, 362-63 
(Cal. 1947). The Bedford decision was thus based on the fact 
that the lessor had no damages in terms of lost rental and in no 
way supports or even states the idea that a lessor waives the 
opportunity to sue for damages resulting from the lessee's breaches 
by accepting payments of rent. 
The ultimate result of Plitt1s argument that by ac-
cepting rental payments, a landlord waives all breaches of the 
lease agreement is to require a lessor to immediately declare 
a forfeiture of the lease agreement and refuse to accept further 
rental payments in order to file suit for damages caused by 
any breach of the lease agreement, no matter what magnitude or 
variety of breach is involved. Otherwise, the opportunity to 
litigate a claim for damages against the lessee would be lost 
-6-
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through the all-encompassing application of the waiver prin-
ciple. Obviously, no such result is required by the authorities 
that have considered the waiver question. In fact, quite the 
opposite is true, as the Atkinson court and other courts hav£ 
confirmed. Cf. Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501 (Nev. 1968); 
Klein v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359 (Mun. Ct., D.C. 1943). 
Whatever result is reached in this action on the issue 
of waiver of Plitt's forfeiture of the leasehold, it should 
have no impact on Woodland's right to maintain its action for 
damages resulting from Plitt's breaches of the lease agreement. 
Plitt's payments of rent cannot compensate Woodland for the 
damages occasioned by Plitt's breaches of the lease agreement. 
The district court's summary judgment order would deny Woodland 
the right to establish its damages. Such preclusion is unwar-
ranted by the facts of this action and by the authorities 
that have expressed themselves on the waiver issue. Accordingly, 
the district court's summary judgment ruling as it applies to 
Woodland's claims for damages resulting from Plitt's breaches 
of the lease agreement should be reversed. 
III. rhere is an Implied Covenant under the Lease Agreement 
for Plitt to operate the Drive-in Theatre in a Prudent and a 
Businesslike Fashion. Plitt asserts in its brief to this Court 
that "not only is the lessee under no obligation to maximize 
the lessor's percentage rental, but as long as he pays the mini-
mum rental, he has no obligation even to do business on the 
premises." (Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 40.) Plitt com-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pletely misses Woodland's point with regard to performance under 
the lease agreement. Plitt did not choose to allow the Woodland 
Drive-In Theatre to sit idle while Plitt paid the minimum rent 
provided for in the lease agreement to Woodland, Plitt ran the 
drive-in theatre business, and it is Woodland's complaint that 
through improper maintenance and neglect of the physical plant 
of the theatre, Plitt allowed the business of the theatre to 
deteriorate so that Woodland's receipts under the percentage 
rental provisions of the lease were artificially limited. 
What Woodland is attempting to establish through its 
claims that Plitt (and formerly, ABC Intermountain Theatres, 
Incorporated) failed to operate the theatre in a prudent, 
diligent and businesslike manner is the damages to Woodland 
resulting from Plitt's neglectful operation and faulty maintenance 
of the Woodland Drive-in Theatre. Woodland does not presume 
to set a particular level of performance for Plitt's conduct 
of the drive-in theatre business. However, it is Woodland's 
contention that Plitt allowed the physical plant of the theat3:e 
to deteriorate so greatly that many potential theatre patrons 
were repelled by the theatre's state of disrepair and others 
had to be turned away because Plitt and/or ABC had failed to 
maintain facilities adequate to serve them. Woodland's claim 
plainly presents a question of fact that cannot be disposed of 
by summary judgment, and Woodland should have the opportunity 
to present its supporting evidence before the trier of fact. 
-8-
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One thing is clear from the cases cited by Plitt in 
its brief to this Court, and that is that percentage rental 
provisions are in the nature of agreements "sui generis" and 
must be interpreted according to their own peculiar terms. See 
Percoff v. Solomon, 67 So. 2d 31, 39 (Ala. 1953). See also Stern 
v. The Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955); Monte Corp. v. 
Stephens, 324 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1958); Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, 
281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1955); Masciotra v. Harlow, 233 P.2d 586 
(Cal. 1951); Palm v. Mortgage Investment Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 
(Tex. 1950); Cousins Investment Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 
113 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1941). In Stern v. The Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d 
939 (10th Cir. 1955), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
the standard for finding an implied covenant or obligation in 
relation to a contractual agreement otherwise written. 
[I]f it is clear from all of the pertinent 
parts or provisions of the contract, taken 
together and considered in the light of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the 
parties at the time of its execution, that 
the obligation in question was within the 
contemplation of the parties or was necessary 
to carry their intention into effect, it will 
be implied and enforced. Id. at 943. 
The percentage rental provisions relevant in this 
action provide for payments of fifteen percent (15%) of the 
gross admission receipts above $183,333.00 and fifteen percent 
(15%) of the gross concession receipts in excess of $65,000. 
The derelictions of the defendants-respondents Plitt and ABC 
responsible for limiting Woodland's receipts under the percentage 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rental provisions of the lease agreement have been previously 
outlined in appellant Woodland's initial brief to this Court. 
What Woodland is asking for is damages resulting from Plitt's 
and ABC's failure to operate the Drive-In Theatre in a prudent 
and businesslike fashion. Such prudent and businesslike opera-
tion , if the theatre business was run at all, was certainly 
envisaged in the lease agreementf and Woodland is entitled to 
an opportunity to present its case to prove its harm. Woodland 
has presented a clear issue of fact. The district court's 
summary judgment ruling should thus be overturned and Woodland's 
action reinstated. 
CONCLUSION 
In its brief to this Court, Plitt has relied on 
a series of overly broad propositions to obfuscate the legal 
principles that clearly apply in relation to this appeal. Those 
principles are: (1) Waiver of a lessee's forfeiture of the 
leasehold is a matter of the lessor's intent, to be gathered by 
the trier of fact from the lessor's words, writings and con-
duct. The acceptance of rent by the lessor does not waive the 
lessee's forfeiture as a matter of law. (2) Acceptance of 
rent does not waive the lessor's right to bring a suit for 
damages resulting from the lessee's breach of the lease agree-
ment. (3) An implied covenant may be found from the lease 
agreement itself or from the facts and circumstances surroun-
ing its execution. 
-10-
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Woodland has had no opportunity to present its claims, 
and such an opportunity is clearly mandated by the record in 
this action to date. Plitt is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, and accordingly the district court's summary 
judgment rulings should be reversed. 
DATED this 1*%k> day of November, 1976. 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
Daniel L. Berman 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Randall L. Dunn 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 533-8383 
By (lfi/\;J~Ajl, X. XT 
Randall L. Dunn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Woodland Theatres, Inc. 
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